Tag Indonesia Defense Diplomacy

JAPAN-AUSTRALIA DEFENSE PACT IN INDO-PACIFIC
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Hendra Manurung, is currently doctoral candidate of International Relations, Padjadjaran University, Bandung; Teuku Rezasyah is Associate Professor of International Relations at Padjadjaran University, Bandung.

It is not difficult to understand why Japan and Australia plan developing defense cooperation for some years previously. Most likely the factor of militarization and deployment of the Chinese navy since late December 2019 in the South China Sea is one of the main triggers.

The defense pact is confirmed to be Japan’s first agreement after 60 years to allow a foreign military presence on its territory, since the status of a defense agreement in 1960 with the United States, which allowed America to place warships, fighter jets, and, thousands of military troops on board, around the territory of Japan.

The challenges and risks posed to the global and regional geostrategic landscape, particularly by or under the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the dynamics in major power relations.

At present, all countries in these regions also face non-traditional challenges such as terrorism, smuggling, natural disasters, and cybercrime, which no single country can tackle and overcome on its own, have been widely considered as common concerns by policy-makers regional leaders.

Meanwhile, ASEAN as a regional organization should to be serious on responding to current regional conditions and immediately reducing escalate tensions that may arise and lead to open conflicts. After the US presidential election on November 6, 2020, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris won the election and will be sworn in on January 21, 2021, as the 46th US President replacing previous president, Donald Trump (45th US President, 2016-2020).

The good news of new US leadership is predicted will reduce the US and China trade war globally along with both major powers rivalries in the South China Sea and India and China border disputed conflict killed twenty and injured others, Indian soldiers, recently.

From 1967 to 2020, ASEAN as a regional organization is able to maintain regional cooperation and supposed to be remaining as the primary driving force in steering regional peace and stability to develop further as a central pillar in the evolving regional security architecture years ahead.

The defense pact between Japan and Australia was agreed upon and signed by Yoshihide Suga and Scott Morrison in Tokyo on November 17, 2020 (Kompas, 19/2/2020). The two countries have been negotiating a six-year defense agreement (2014-2020), although this agreement still needs to be ratified by both parliamentarians in Canberra and Tokyo.

This latest agreement is to facilitate more joint military operations and exercises in their respective regions. If needed in a situation of urgency, it is possible for the Japanese military to protect Australian troops and vice versa.

The pact, called the Reciprocal Access Agreement, provides a legal framework that allows troops to visit each other’s countries and conduct joint training and operations. These developments have further strengthened the defense relationship between the two US allies.

The move will also be Japan’s first agreement to include a foreign military presence on its territory since signing a troop status agreement in 1960 with the United States. Tokyo works closely with Washington D.C, enabling the US to deploy warships, fighter jets, and thousands of troops in and around Japan as part of a military alliance on a regional security home-base.

It is implemented by deploying around fifty thousand US soldiers and its 7th fleet armada. Perhaps, Australia also might be able to send two thousand to five thousand military troops, warships, and frigates to securing Japanese territories.

Japan and Australia previously established defense cooperation in 2007, a first for Japan with a country other than the US. Then in 2013, the two countries agreed to share military supplies mutually, and in 2017 the cooperation boosted to include the procurement of military ammunition after Japan then relaxed import restrictions related to the transfer of weapons equipment.

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Essentially, the two countries, Australia and Japan indeed do not explicitly mention China’s presence in the region as a major and real threat in the Defense Pact. However, this defense agreement was carried out to strengthen both countries’ defense cooperation in response to the expansion of China’s military presence in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Hong Kong, and beyond. Obviously, these two countries are targeting China.

In the South China Sea, Beijing has been accused of militarization in disputed territorial waters, while in the East China Sea, Japan and China have disputed over ownership of the island of Senkaku. On the other hand, Canberra is also arguing with Beijing over restrictions on the export of a number of Australian exporting products to China.

As with other defense pacts, this agreement is a right and part of state sovereignty to maintain regional peace and security and the survival of their national interests in the region.

However, if in the end, this defense pact will lead to the deployment of military force, then of course this can create tension in the situation and can trigger an escalation of open conflict in the Asia Pacific region.

Previously, the Japanese government had stepped up defense under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, by purchasing stealth fighters and other modern military weapons, as well as encouraging Japanese military cooperation and adjusting the compatibility of military weapons with America.

In addition to discussing the defense pact between Japan and Australia, they also discussed cooperation in overcoming the coronavirus and hydrogen technology. Japan aims to become the third-largest carbon-free economy by 2050.

During the meeting, Morrison also discussed energy and climate change with Japanese businessmen and indicated that carbon capture and storage and low-emission technologies would be part of the domestic solution. Australia has agreed to achieve zero carbon emissions within the stipulated time.

Morrison has rejected calls for a 2050 target, vowing to do so when it can explain the economic costs to the Australian people. Australia is heavily dependent on coal and gas exports. Korea, the US, and the UK have designated 2050 as zero carbon emissions as the UK has urged Australia to reduce carbon emissions.

During his visit, Morrison also met with the president of the International Olympic Committee, Thomas Bach, who is trying to push Queensland to host the Summer Olympics and Paralympics in 2032.

Japan and Australia are currently having a less than harmonious relationship with China. With Japan relations deteriorated due to Japan’s wartime territory of China and sovereignty dispute in Senkaku, a chain of islands in the East China Sea regions known as Diaoyu in China. The Japanese administered the island; however, Chinese military surveillance ships were frequently near the island. Meanwhile, Australia clashed with China over Prime Minister Morrison’s appeal in April 2020, explicitly asking for a thorough comprehensive transparent investigation into the global outbreak of the coronavirus and upsetting China to continue with restrictions on imported products from Australia.

Japan has embarked on a vision of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” of economic and security cooperation as opposed to Chinese influence, and recently Japan hosted foreign ministerial discussions among countries known as the “Quad” which consists of from America, Australia, and India.

These four countries are trying to invite countries from Southeast Asia and its surroundings to reduce the expansion of Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

This bamboo curtain country defends its decisions and behavior in regional seas as peaceful actions and denies violating international rules and deliberately ignores the 1982 UNCLOS. China also considers the formation of the Quad as the embryo of NATO birth in the Asia Pacific which aims to fight it frontally.

Warships and aircraft from the four “Quad” countries kick off the annual joint military exercise Malabar in the Bay of Bengal, India on November 3, 2020.

The joint military exercise is being carried out less than a month since mid-October 2020 following a highly symbolic Quad meeting in Tokyo with foreign ministers from the four most powerful democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Australia is rejoining the exercise for the first time in 13 years, since its participation in 2007.

The Malabar exercises are not officially linked to the Quad forum, but they are clearly a counterweight to Beijing’s expanding military and political influence in the region.

The Quad’s joint military exercises in Malabar have the veiled intention of thwarting Chinese influence.

The military activity is divided into two phases, namely the first phase starting from 3 to 6 November 2020, followed by the second phase at the end of November.

These military exercises also include anti-submarine and anti-aircraft practical exercises designed to improve interoperability between the military forces of the four nations.

This joint Malabar military exercise certainly provides an opportunity for the navies of the four like-minded nations, sharing a common vision of a more stable, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, to operate and train together in achieving regional stability.

To conclude, it is still relevant to highlight ASEAN’s role in the meeting involving these countries to keep reminding those intentional ambitions, that, as stated in the ASEAN Chairperson’s Statement at the last Summit 2020, “not to use threats or force” in resolving problems in the region. When talking about ASEAN and optimizing its influence, Indonesia clearly is still recognized as prioritizing a major role among global major powers.

EMPOWERING INDONESIA’S DEFENSE DIPLOMACY IN ASIA PACIFIC
Presiden Rusia Vladimir Putin dan Presiden Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (https://en.kremlin.ru/)

Writer: Hendra Manurung (Hendra Manurung is currently pursuing a doctoral degree in international relations at Padjadjaran University, Bandung)

Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto visited eight countries since being officially inaugurated by President Joko Widodo on 20 October 2019. On 23 October 2019, he visited Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey, China, Japan, France, and finally Russia. Prabowo carried out a number of missions. It began with the release of Indonesian citizens who were held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines to increasing strategic cooperation in the field of bilateral defense.

However, the intensity of Prabowo’s visit invited criticism from several groups such as DPR members and defense military observers but received support from President Joko Widodo. The President emphasized that Prabowo’s working visit was carried out in the context of carrying out and intensify Indonesia’s defense diplomacy abroad.

One of the objectives of the Minister of Defense is to strengthen and modernize the main tools of the Indonesian weaponry system, by exploring the possibility of procurement from defense equipment producing countries that cannot yet be fulfilled by the domestic defense industry as well as offering Indonesian weapons system products that are already capable of being produced by the domestic defense industry, such PT. Pindad Bandung and PT PAL Surabaya to other consumer countries.

Indonesia Defense Diplomacy

Efforts to seize and defend Indonesian independence involve all components of the nation in various ways. For example, the army and the people take up arms on the battlefield, and diplomats are fighting at the diplomatic negotiating table with diplomats from other countries, for example in the General Offensive on 1 March 1949.

This Indonesian heroic military action in reclaiming Dutch-controlled Jogjakarta was also intended to show the international community that Indonesia and the TNI still existed. The success of the Indonesian military attack then became ammunition for diplomats to thrill the negotiating table.

As a result, the Netherlands recognized Indonesia’s sovereignty in a Round Table Conference on 27 December 1949. This is because diplomacy was originally intended to eliminate conflict, ease tensions, avoid war, and end the war (Simamora, Opportunities, and Challenges of Defense Diplomacy: 2013).

Indonesia also had the experience of having a formidable defense weaponry system during the struggle against Dutch colonialism and after proclaiming independence on August 17, 1945. Among them, the ownership of various types of modern combat aircraft at that time, such as the TU-16-KS bomber, the Mig-15 fighter plane / 17/19/21, Ilyuhsin, and attack helicopters. Also, the Indonesian warship, the destroyer class KRI Irian, which became the largest ship in the Southeast Asia region, were all purchased from the Soviet Union (currently is the Russian Federation). The defense equipment was used by the Indonesian armed forces for propaganda to reclaim West Irian from the hands of the Dutch, 1962 to 1963.

The superiority of Indonesian defense equipment in the Asia Pacific region is used optimally as a major support for diplomacy negotiation against the arbitrariness of Western countries against the territory of the country that was once colonized.

However, apart from the shrewdness of President Soekarno who took advantage of his closeness to the Soviet Union as a bargaining power to garner support from the United States, diplomats used it well until West Irian was finally captured. Thus, defense diplomacy has been carried out by the country’s leaders since the beginning of independence and during the war after independence.

Defense diplomacy is actually a new vocabulary in the world of international relations. The term defense diplomacy first appeared in the UK Department of Defense’s Strategic Defense Review which was published in 1998. The main focus of SDR’s version of defense diplomacy aimed at the countries of the former Soviet Union and former members of the Warsaw Pact is to carry out reforms in the security sector and conflict prevention. For this reason, as explained by Cottey and Forster (in Sulayman: 2016).

Defense diplomacy can be defined as the use of armed forces and related infrastructure during peacetime as a main supporting tool to pursue the main objectives of foreign policy and national defense.

Obviously, Article 1 Paragraph 1 of Law Number 3 of 2002 concerning State Defense explicitly states that national defense is all efforts to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

The post-Indonesian proclamation, as the largest archipelagic country in the world that has a commitment and concern for the implementation of international world order and lasting peace, Indonesia certainly avoids using any hard power in facing threats from other countries. Indonesia places diplomacy as the first line of defense. This is also parallel with Indonesia’s defense doctrine which is defensive, not offensive.

However, defense diplomacy to maintain and achieve national interest cannot be separated from how much national power one has. One of the nine national powers, referring to Morgenthau, is military capabilities. Mearsheimer said the military is the actual power for a country.

Therefore, military power needs to be increased in attack and defense capacity in line with the need to strengthen defense diplomacy in international relations. Indonesia was able to carry out high-profile diplomacy which was very calculated during the Old Order era (1945-1966), one of which was inseparable from the power of defense equipment it had through the support and military assistance of the Soviet Union.

In the early days of reform after the fall of the New Order on 20 May 1998, the condition of the national defense equipment was appalling. At that time, Indonesia could not maintain and modernize defense equipment due to the Washington D.C embargo decision which was lifted in 2005. For this reason, the government is determined to strengthen our defense equipment. One of them is the minimum essential forces (MEF) which are targeted to be achieved 100 percent by 2024.

Indonesian defense diplomacy mission of the current defense minister showed his goodwill to many countries, one of which is to strengthen bilateral defense relations and cooperation strategically. This includes enhancing bilateral relations through defense cooperation and boosting military capacity to contribute to peace mission operations in countries facing conflict.

Various shortcomings in the procurement of defense equipment in the past are valuable lessons not to be repeated, for example, the dependence on defense equipment in one particular country.

The eight countries visited can illustrate that the Indonesian government is building strategic defense cooperation, including efforts to increase the modernization of defense equipment. Everything is done through the procurement of modern, efficient, transparent, and scalable defense equipment. However, it is also offered for domestic products to be used by other countries to support accelerate the growth of the domestic defense industry.

In the early days of reform after the fall of the New Order on 20 May 1998, the condition of the national defense equipment was appalling. At that time, Indonesia could not maintain and modernize defense equipment due to the US embargo which was lifted in 2005. For this reason, the government is determined to strengthen our defense equipment. One of them is the minimum essential forces (MEF) which are targeted to be achieved 100 percent by 2024.

In the midst of the United States and China rivalries in the South China Sea region from 2017 to the present time, the Indonesian defense diplomacy mission done by Prabowo showed his goodwill to many countries, one of which is to strengthen defense relations positively. This includes enhancing bilateral relations through defense cooperation and increasing military capacity to contribute to peace mission operations in countries facing conflict.

Various shortcomings in the procurement of defense equipment in the past are valuable lessons not to be repeated, for example, the country dependence on defense equipment in one particular country.

The eight countries visited can illustrate that the Indonesian government is building strategic defense cooperation, including efforts to increase the modernization of defense equipment. Everything is done through the procurement of modern, efficient, transparent, and scalable defense equipment. However, it is also offered for domestic products to be used by other countries to help accelerate the growth of the domestic defense industry.

Intensive care and how to start a road map towards defense industry independence must indeed be initiated and implemented by all Indonesian stakeholders of the national defense system. This is confirmed to be in line with the presidential instruction to reduce imports and dependence on defense equipment from major powers in the Asia Pacific region.

However, preferably, for defense equipment products which the domestic defense industry cannot yet provide, it is better if the purchasing mechanism from abroad should be pursued in the interest of a strong national defense and not easily underestimated.

Therefore, in the procurement of defense equipment, both from within and outside the country, Indonesia must prioritize four principles or the so-called politics of procurement of the main tools of the national weapon system, namely: efficiency, geopolitics, geo-economy, geo-strategy, budget efficiency, and transfer of military weaponry technology, and the ability to sell Indonesian weaponry to various countries.